So, the betrayal of democracy by the entire political class is now complete.
Wanna guess what happens in the next few years in this country?
Brexit process
Moderator: Peak Moderation
-
Lord Beria3
- Posts: 5066
- Joined: 25 Feb 2009, 20:57
- Location: Moscow Russia
- Contact:
Eurointelligence latest...
There are still a few options left for May
Economics is a useless tool when it comes to discussions about distant future states of the world, which is why we are ignoring the hysterical warnings by the Bank of England and the Treasury on the impact of various Brexit scenarios. The only point we would make is political: a fear-based campaign did not work last time, and we don’t think that the current hysteria will fare much better.
Back in the real world, there were two important Brexit developments yesterday. One was the announcement by the European Court of Justice that advocate general Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona will deliver his opinion on the Scottish case about the Art. 50 revocation on December 4. We tried yesterday to decipher the deeper meaning of this announcement - whether it would favour revocation or not - but soon gave up. It is more fruitful to speculate on what this means procedurally. We heard one EU law expert making the prediction that the court might give its ruling before December 11. We recall that the opinion of the advocate general carries great weight in the ECJ. The opinion is followed by the court in most cases, but not always. The reason to expect an early court ruling would be the political mess created by subsequently divergent opinions. Imagine the advocate general saying revocation is ok and the UK parliament then rejecting the withdrawal treaty, only to be told in March that revocation is not possible at all. We therefore see two procedural outcomes as likely: The court either rules before December 11, or if not, the court will broadly concur with the views of the advocate general. For Brexit, it does not matter whether the European Council has to vote by unanimity or, for example, by qualified majority. If a UK government were to request a revocation of Brexit, the European Council would probably accept it.Â
The other important development was mentioned in a story by Bloomberg, which reports that Downing Street was considering to allow amendments to the Brexit vote on December 11. The debate is scheduled to take place between Dec 4-6 and Dec 10-11, with a vote on the final day. There could be six amendments, according to Bloomberg. The reason to allow the amendments, resisted by the government at first, is to demonstrate that no other options carry a majority either. The Sun has reported that some cabinet ministers have urged Theresa May to delay the vote. We ourselves are hearing that Downing Street and Whitehall are currently in a state of panic. There is no plan B ready to unroll. A defeat could thus trigger all the options we outlined in our scenario analysis over the last two days.
As in the case of the expected ECJ ruling, it is best to think about the post-vote scenario in terms of procedures rather than desired or even probable outcomes. Downing Street warns of a defeat by as much as 150-200 votes. But we think this is unlikely. For starters, people can express their dissatisfaction by abstaining rather than voting against. And we also assume that the fear of a massive defeat and a possible resignation of May would drive some Tory MPs to support the deal. We think, however, that it is unlikely that this deal would be carried at a first vote. A relatively narrow defeat would allow a second vote later. Â
Another procedural possibility we can think of would be for the government to separate the votes on the withdrawal treaty and the political declaration. The EU will not agree to amending the withdrawal treaty itself, but would be open to a different phrasing of the future relationship. A separation of votes would help advocates of the Norway-plus option to vote in favour of the treaty, but against the declaration. We have not heard any suggestions that the government would be pursuing this strategy, but we think this is a more promising avenue than what would otherwise turn into a modern political equivalent of a Charge of the Light Brigade. Maybe this constitutes a strategy for a second vote.Â
We broadly agree with the FT’s editorial that the deal should be supported, and if it fails, that the other deal options, such as Norway-plus, should be pursued. The FT writes that if the ultimate choices were to narrow down to deal-vs-no-deal, a referendum should decide.Â
What is usually understated in these discussion is the need for a government to support the process since a referendum requires legislation. We doubt very much that a Tory-led government would happily accept a referendum that might lead to a Brexit reversal. Such an outcome would tear the party apart. We also doubt that there would be agreement on the question to be asked. John McDonnell, the shadow chancellor, said yesterday that Labour would favour a second referendum as a final consequence if the Brexit process did not result in early elections. But he said it would be a referendum between the deal and Remain. We doubt very much that it would be legally and politically possible to give the electorate a choice between two non-exclusive options. And we are not sure that the EU would unanimously accept a longish Brexit extension if no-deal was on the menu. We remain convinced that the EU’s best strategy to force agreement on the withdrawal treaty is to rule out Brexit extension, in order to force the Commons to confront what would then become a binary choice.
I remain unpersuaded by the case for a second referendum. The original referendum was based on Art. 50, which clearly stated that no-deal was a possible outcome, as was any deal that was mutually agreed. One could make a case for a referendum to decide between accepting the agreement or not accepting the agreement, but would this not be an abuse of the consultative referendum procedure for detailed legislation that a representative democracy should be able to carry? Much of the current debate about the second referendum is based on a general failure to understand the logic of Art. 50, which was intended to offer the leaving country and the EU a binary choice.
Apart from this formal observation, I also don’t see the political case for a second referendum. Even if there were a parliamentary majority in favour of a second referendum in principle, I would be very surprised if the House of Commons could agree on a question or the process, especially if you are hellbent to deny the only logical choice under Art. 50 - which would be to accept or reject the deal. A three-way referendum is not going to settle the issues, and having two consecutive referendums - Remain vs Leave and Deal vs No Deal, means the first of the two would be a re-run of the 2016 referendum. The referendum would be more likely about whether the UK is still a democracy than about Europe. I would expect it to be accompanied and followed by civil unrest. And it is possible that large parts of the electorate would boycott it.
In the end the best strategy for the Conservatives would be to unite around May’s deal. Any of the alternatives - a no-deal Brexit and a second referendum - would destroy the party. And if you are genuinely pro-EU (as opposed to be pro-EU-opt-outs), then you should accept the 2016 vote and help organise a campaign for a more sustainable version of membership than the current one.
(Wolfgang Münchau)
There are still a few options left for May
Economics is a useless tool when it comes to discussions about distant future states of the world, which is why we are ignoring the hysterical warnings by the Bank of England and the Treasury on the impact of various Brexit scenarios. The only point we would make is political: a fear-based campaign did not work last time, and we don’t think that the current hysteria will fare much better.
Back in the real world, there were two important Brexit developments yesterday. One was the announcement by the European Court of Justice that advocate general Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona will deliver his opinion on the Scottish case about the Art. 50 revocation on December 4. We tried yesterday to decipher the deeper meaning of this announcement - whether it would favour revocation or not - but soon gave up. It is more fruitful to speculate on what this means procedurally. We heard one EU law expert making the prediction that the court might give its ruling before December 11. We recall that the opinion of the advocate general carries great weight in the ECJ. The opinion is followed by the court in most cases, but not always. The reason to expect an early court ruling would be the political mess created by subsequently divergent opinions. Imagine the advocate general saying revocation is ok and the UK parliament then rejecting the withdrawal treaty, only to be told in March that revocation is not possible at all. We therefore see two procedural outcomes as likely: The court either rules before December 11, or if not, the court will broadly concur with the views of the advocate general. For Brexit, it does not matter whether the European Council has to vote by unanimity or, for example, by qualified majority. If a UK government were to request a revocation of Brexit, the European Council would probably accept it.Â
The other important development was mentioned in a story by Bloomberg, which reports that Downing Street was considering to allow amendments to the Brexit vote on December 11. The debate is scheduled to take place between Dec 4-6 and Dec 10-11, with a vote on the final day. There could be six amendments, according to Bloomberg. The reason to allow the amendments, resisted by the government at first, is to demonstrate that no other options carry a majority either. The Sun has reported that some cabinet ministers have urged Theresa May to delay the vote. We ourselves are hearing that Downing Street and Whitehall are currently in a state of panic. There is no plan B ready to unroll. A defeat could thus trigger all the options we outlined in our scenario analysis over the last two days.
As in the case of the expected ECJ ruling, it is best to think about the post-vote scenario in terms of procedures rather than desired or even probable outcomes. Downing Street warns of a defeat by as much as 150-200 votes. But we think this is unlikely. For starters, people can express their dissatisfaction by abstaining rather than voting against. And we also assume that the fear of a massive defeat and a possible resignation of May would drive some Tory MPs to support the deal. We think, however, that it is unlikely that this deal would be carried at a first vote. A relatively narrow defeat would allow a second vote later. Â
Another procedural possibility we can think of would be for the government to separate the votes on the withdrawal treaty and the political declaration. The EU will not agree to amending the withdrawal treaty itself, but would be open to a different phrasing of the future relationship. A separation of votes would help advocates of the Norway-plus option to vote in favour of the treaty, but against the declaration. We have not heard any suggestions that the government would be pursuing this strategy, but we think this is a more promising avenue than what would otherwise turn into a modern political equivalent of a Charge of the Light Brigade. Maybe this constitutes a strategy for a second vote.Â
We broadly agree with the FT’s editorial that the deal should be supported, and if it fails, that the other deal options, such as Norway-plus, should be pursued. The FT writes that if the ultimate choices were to narrow down to deal-vs-no-deal, a referendum should decide.Â
What is usually understated in these discussion is the need for a government to support the process since a referendum requires legislation. We doubt very much that a Tory-led government would happily accept a referendum that might lead to a Brexit reversal. Such an outcome would tear the party apart. We also doubt that there would be agreement on the question to be asked. John McDonnell, the shadow chancellor, said yesterday that Labour would favour a second referendum as a final consequence if the Brexit process did not result in early elections. But he said it would be a referendum between the deal and Remain. We doubt very much that it would be legally and politically possible to give the electorate a choice between two non-exclusive options. And we are not sure that the EU would unanimously accept a longish Brexit extension if no-deal was on the menu. We remain convinced that the EU’s best strategy to force agreement on the withdrawal treaty is to rule out Brexit extension, in order to force the Commons to confront what would then become a binary choice.
I remain unpersuaded by the case for a second referendum. The original referendum was based on Art. 50, which clearly stated that no-deal was a possible outcome, as was any deal that was mutually agreed. One could make a case for a referendum to decide between accepting the agreement or not accepting the agreement, but would this not be an abuse of the consultative referendum procedure for detailed legislation that a representative democracy should be able to carry? Much of the current debate about the second referendum is based on a general failure to understand the logic of Art. 50, which was intended to offer the leaving country and the EU a binary choice.
Apart from this formal observation, I also don’t see the political case for a second referendum. Even if there were a parliamentary majority in favour of a second referendum in principle, I would be very surprised if the House of Commons could agree on a question or the process, especially if you are hellbent to deny the only logical choice under Art. 50 - which would be to accept or reject the deal. A three-way referendum is not going to settle the issues, and having two consecutive referendums - Remain vs Leave and Deal vs No Deal, means the first of the two would be a re-run of the 2016 referendum. The referendum would be more likely about whether the UK is still a democracy than about Europe. I would expect it to be accompanied and followed by civil unrest. And it is possible that large parts of the electorate would boycott it.
In the end the best strategy for the Conservatives would be to unite around May’s deal. Any of the alternatives - a no-deal Brexit and a second referendum - would destroy the party. And if you are genuinely pro-EU (as opposed to be pro-EU-opt-outs), then you should accept the 2016 vote and help organise a campaign for a more sustainable version of membership than the current one.
(Wolfgang Münchau)
Peace always has been and always will be an intermittent flash of light in a dark history of warfare, violence, and destruction
-
UndercoverElephant
- Posts: 13501
- Joined: 10 Mar 2008, 00:00
- Location: UK
This could not be more wrong. If the tories pass May's deal then they will never, ever be forgiven for it. The other two outcomes will severely damage the tories but not destroy them. Passing the deal preserves it for the short term, but in the long term will utterly annihilate them.In the end the best strategy for the Conservatives would be to unite around May’s deal. Any of the alternatives - a no-deal Brexit and a second referendum - would destroy the party.
The person writing this understands the economics far better than he understands the politics.
-
Little John
The following shows precisely why an attempt would be made to deliberately construct the second referendum so as split the leave vote even though, all other things being equal, the leave vote has actually hardened since the EU referendum
https://brexitlatestnews.com/new-pollin ... exit-deal/
https://brexitlatestnews.com/new-pollin ... exit-deal/
-
Lord Beria3
- Posts: 5066
- Joined: 25 Feb 2009, 20:57
- Location: Moscow Russia
- Contact:
Eurointelligence latest...
May’s one and only trump card
There is an admirable stubbornness about Theresa May, a quality surely needed to get a Brexit deal passed. But this is a quality that might also backfire. We note that even now she refuses to engage in any of the plan-B discussions currently taking place. The best argument in favour of her plan is that it is the only one that is consistent internally, consistent with both UK and EU red lines, and legally feasible. Virtually all alternative suggestions, including Labour’s unicorn Brexit, fails at least one of those tests. In the case of Labour's version, there is no way the EU would agree to both a customs union as well as an internal market relationship, and then allow restrictions on free movement on top of that. May’s delivery remains wooden and unappealing but, when she faces Jeremy Corbyn in a TV debate on Sunday, it may just become apparent that her plan is the only feasible one. The politics, however, may not work that way. She could still manage to lose that debate. She has an enormous information advantage, though, even over the members of her own cabinet let alone the opposition frontbench team. We urge readers not to deduce that the outcome of the vote is a forgone conclusions. The vote count is indeed looking awful for May at this point. But the realisation of a lack of alternatives has yet to sink in.
One alternative under discussion is the Norway option. Jean-Claude Piris is worth reading on the subject. His conclusion is that Efta is legally possible but not politically, and especially not as an interim option. He gives a detailed summary of the many subtle, and not so subtle, issues that are involved. We would like to highlight two big issues. We fail to see how the Norway option can get rid of the backstop. The EU will still require an Irish backstop in case the Norway option cannot be agreed on time.Â
Secondly, the EU is very unlikely to agree both an Efta/EEA deal as well as a customs union. In fact, the EEA treaty states explicitly that there shall be no customs union. That treaty would need to be changed, and that treaty change would have to be ratified by all EU member states plus the four EEA member countries. The political price the EU would extract from the UK could bordering on extortion.
The Times reports that the UK government may end up reviving another plan B option, which Theresa May briefly considered in the final phases of the negotiations, but dropped when she realised that the EU would not accept it. This is the right to opt out of the backstop unilaterally. We recall that the EU would have accepted this idea only on the condition of a backstop only for Northern Ireland becoming active. The price for an all-UK backstop was not having a unilateral opt-out. We also fail to see the political logic of this. While a unilateral opt-out would please the Tory backbenchers, the version that would be acceptable to the EU would drive an even bigger wedge between Northern Ireland and mainland UK. The proposal would not help May to secure support from the DUP.
In this context we noted an amendment by another backbencher who advocates that the UK signs the agreement, but then exits unilaterally using the provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This backbencher wants to break the treaty even before he signs it.
May also yesterday ruled out a second referendum once again. We believe that her strategy is simply to drive the process towards the cliff, and confront the Commons with a final take-it-or-leave-it choice between her deal and no Brexit. It is possible, in theory, that she could change her mind on the issue of a second referendum, or that the Tory party could replace her with someone who drops her deal - and proposes a Remain vs no-Deal Brexit referendum. We saw a poll yesterday that showed a 52/48 split in favour of no-deal brexit in a direct run-off. We are also not sure whether the EU would agree to an Art. 50 extension if the UK rejected the withdrawal agreement for good. Another Brexit referendum defeat would be a reputational disaster for the EU, especially coming around the time of the EU elections. As MPs approach the final stretch of the Brexit process they may start to realise the binary nature of Art. 50, over which much of the UK has been in denial.Â
While this is the technical reality of the situation, politics may drive the process in other directions. We noted a very good analysis by Simon Nixon who makes a point May’s lack of leadership during the last two years. She has failed to be straight to the public and
"she appears to have concluded that Brexit could only be delivered by stealth, obfuscation and subterfuge. Her Whitehall operation has been secretive, in contrast with the transparency of the EU negotiators and the openness of other national governments. She has relied for advice on a tight circle of advisers with little experience of the EU; even senior cabinet ministers have complained of being left in the dark. Her public statements have been full of endlessly repeated soundbites full of evasions and euphemisms. Above all, she has consistently made claims that have proved to be disingenuous, which has undermined trust among many whose backing she needs to secure."
We agree. The potential for the process to go wrong is massive.
May’s one and only trump card
There is an admirable stubbornness about Theresa May, a quality surely needed to get a Brexit deal passed. But this is a quality that might also backfire. We note that even now she refuses to engage in any of the plan-B discussions currently taking place. The best argument in favour of her plan is that it is the only one that is consistent internally, consistent with both UK and EU red lines, and legally feasible. Virtually all alternative suggestions, including Labour’s unicorn Brexit, fails at least one of those tests. In the case of Labour's version, there is no way the EU would agree to both a customs union as well as an internal market relationship, and then allow restrictions on free movement on top of that. May’s delivery remains wooden and unappealing but, when she faces Jeremy Corbyn in a TV debate on Sunday, it may just become apparent that her plan is the only feasible one. The politics, however, may not work that way. She could still manage to lose that debate. She has an enormous information advantage, though, even over the members of her own cabinet let alone the opposition frontbench team. We urge readers not to deduce that the outcome of the vote is a forgone conclusions. The vote count is indeed looking awful for May at this point. But the realisation of a lack of alternatives has yet to sink in.
One alternative under discussion is the Norway option. Jean-Claude Piris is worth reading on the subject. His conclusion is that Efta is legally possible but not politically, and especially not as an interim option. He gives a detailed summary of the many subtle, and not so subtle, issues that are involved. We would like to highlight two big issues. We fail to see how the Norway option can get rid of the backstop. The EU will still require an Irish backstop in case the Norway option cannot be agreed on time.Â
Secondly, the EU is very unlikely to agree both an Efta/EEA deal as well as a customs union. In fact, the EEA treaty states explicitly that there shall be no customs union. That treaty would need to be changed, and that treaty change would have to be ratified by all EU member states plus the four EEA member countries. The political price the EU would extract from the UK could bordering on extortion.
The Times reports that the UK government may end up reviving another plan B option, which Theresa May briefly considered in the final phases of the negotiations, but dropped when she realised that the EU would not accept it. This is the right to opt out of the backstop unilaterally. We recall that the EU would have accepted this idea only on the condition of a backstop only for Northern Ireland becoming active. The price for an all-UK backstop was not having a unilateral opt-out. We also fail to see the political logic of this. While a unilateral opt-out would please the Tory backbenchers, the version that would be acceptable to the EU would drive an even bigger wedge between Northern Ireland and mainland UK. The proposal would not help May to secure support from the DUP.
In this context we noted an amendment by another backbencher who advocates that the UK signs the agreement, but then exits unilaterally using the provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This backbencher wants to break the treaty even before he signs it.
May also yesterday ruled out a second referendum once again. We believe that her strategy is simply to drive the process towards the cliff, and confront the Commons with a final take-it-or-leave-it choice between her deal and no Brexit. It is possible, in theory, that she could change her mind on the issue of a second referendum, or that the Tory party could replace her with someone who drops her deal - and proposes a Remain vs no-Deal Brexit referendum. We saw a poll yesterday that showed a 52/48 split in favour of no-deal brexit in a direct run-off. We are also not sure whether the EU would agree to an Art. 50 extension if the UK rejected the withdrawal agreement for good. Another Brexit referendum defeat would be a reputational disaster for the EU, especially coming around the time of the EU elections. As MPs approach the final stretch of the Brexit process they may start to realise the binary nature of Art. 50, over which much of the UK has been in denial.Â
While this is the technical reality of the situation, politics may drive the process in other directions. We noted a very good analysis by Simon Nixon who makes a point May’s lack of leadership during the last two years. She has failed to be straight to the public and
"she appears to have concluded that Brexit could only be delivered by stealth, obfuscation and subterfuge. Her Whitehall operation has been secretive, in contrast with the transparency of the EU negotiators and the openness of other national governments. She has relied for advice on a tight circle of advisers with little experience of the EU; even senior cabinet ministers have complained of being left in the dark. Her public statements have been full of endlessly repeated soundbites full of evasions and euphemisms. Above all, she has consistently made claims that have proved to be disingenuous, which has undermined trust among many whose backing she needs to secure."
We agree. The potential for the process to go wrong is massive.
Peace always has been and always will be an intermittent flash of light in a dark history of warfare, violence, and destruction
-
kenneal - lagger
- Site Admin
- Posts: 14290
- Joined: 20 Sep 2006, 02:35
- Location: Newbury, Berkshire
- Contact:
-
UndercoverElephant
- Posts: 13501
- Joined: 10 Mar 2008, 00:00
- Location: UK
Why almost everybody in the UK should oppose May's deal.
Why almost everybody in the UK should oppose May's deal:
We are currently being bombarded with a propaganda tsunami attempting to bully MPs into supporting May's deal. Ratifying it might just be the biggest mistake in modern British history. The only entities in whose interest it is to see this deal through are the EU, Theresa May personally and a small minority of the establishment and big business.
The deal would be poor even without the backstop, but not catastrophic. The backstop makes it apocalyptic for the UK, because in the long run we are going to be legally trapped in a situation we cannot escape from without the EU's co-operation, and the EU will extract a terrible price. We will be losing sovereignty, not taking it back. Losing long-term bargaining power, instead of gaining it. And what do we get in return? Short-term minimisation of chaos, a continuation of Theresa May's disastrous premiership, and a few of things we wanted from brexit at a price that is not worth paying. We are being told that the only alternatives (remain and no deal) are disastrous for the UK. What we are not being told is that those alternatives are much worse for the EU.
What happens if we remain in the EU? We become an enormous pain in the EU's backside. UKIP comes back on steroids, and sends its MEPs to a European parliament dealing with UKIP-shaped problems elsewhere. And if the EU fails to respond to serious UK concerns in the future, Article 50 will eventually be triggered again, except next time the UK will be prepared for it. The UK will be back inside the tent, threatening to piss all over the place, and that is no bluff. The EU would almost certainly allow us to cancel brexit if they thought the alternative is no deal, but it would be with trepidation. And the potential problems would only be made worse if they try to extract concessions from us, or cancel the rebate. The EU would much prefer we take the crappy deal than cancel brexit.
And if we leave with no deal? We become an even bigger pain in the EU's backside. The EU ends up with a £39bn hole in its budget and a gargantuan problem in Ireland which cannot be solved without the co-operation of the UK. The withdrawal agreement will not be binned. Instead, the EU will come back to the negotiating table, and this time it won't be holding a gun to our head. Instead, it will be desperate to find some sort of solution to the Irish border problem, and this time there will be no “punishment agenda�. Not to mention that £39bn again.
In short, agreeing to the deal saves the UK short-term pain and prolongs Theresa May's political career, but long-term it totally fucks both the UK and the conservative party. Rejecting the deal and resigning ourselves to either remaining in the EU or leaving with no deal will allow us to replace May with somebody who has a clue what they are doing, and leaves us in a much better place from which to recover from the current crisis. Even for the tory party, apart from May herself, rejecting this deal is the best option in the long term. If the tories vote this through, they will betray everything their party stands for and will pay a terrible price in the long term. It be the end of them.
Regardless of the consequences, this deal must be rejected. And in response to this, do not listen to anybody from an EU country, especially Ireland. It is absolutely in their interest to support the propaganda tsunami in defence of this appalling deal.
We are currently being bombarded with a propaganda tsunami attempting to bully MPs into supporting May's deal. Ratifying it might just be the biggest mistake in modern British history. The only entities in whose interest it is to see this deal through are the EU, Theresa May personally and a small minority of the establishment and big business.
The deal would be poor even without the backstop, but not catastrophic. The backstop makes it apocalyptic for the UK, because in the long run we are going to be legally trapped in a situation we cannot escape from without the EU's co-operation, and the EU will extract a terrible price. We will be losing sovereignty, not taking it back. Losing long-term bargaining power, instead of gaining it. And what do we get in return? Short-term minimisation of chaos, a continuation of Theresa May's disastrous premiership, and a few of things we wanted from brexit at a price that is not worth paying. We are being told that the only alternatives (remain and no deal) are disastrous for the UK. What we are not being told is that those alternatives are much worse for the EU.
What happens if we remain in the EU? We become an enormous pain in the EU's backside. UKIP comes back on steroids, and sends its MEPs to a European parliament dealing with UKIP-shaped problems elsewhere. And if the EU fails to respond to serious UK concerns in the future, Article 50 will eventually be triggered again, except next time the UK will be prepared for it. The UK will be back inside the tent, threatening to piss all over the place, and that is no bluff. The EU would almost certainly allow us to cancel brexit if they thought the alternative is no deal, but it would be with trepidation. And the potential problems would only be made worse if they try to extract concessions from us, or cancel the rebate. The EU would much prefer we take the crappy deal than cancel brexit.
And if we leave with no deal? We become an even bigger pain in the EU's backside. The EU ends up with a £39bn hole in its budget and a gargantuan problem in Ireland which cannot be solved without the co-operation of the UK. The withdrawal agreement will not be binned. Instead, the EU will come back to the negotiating table, and this time it won't be holding a gun to our head. Instead, it will be desperate to find some sort of solution to the Irish border problem, and this time there will be no “punishment agenda�. Not to mention that £39bn again.
In short, agreeing to the deal saves the UK short-term pain and prolongs Theresa May's political career, but long-term it totally fucks both the UK and the conservative party. Rejecting the deal and resigning ourselves to either remaining in the EU or leaving with no deal will allow us to replace May with somebody who has a clue what they are doing, and leaves us in a much better place from which to recover from the current crisis. Even for the tory party, apart from May herself, rejecting this deal is the best option in the long term. If the tories vote this through, they will betray everything their party stands for and will pay a terrible price in the long term. It be the end of them.
Regardless of the consequences, this deal must be rejected. And in response to this, do not listen to anybody from an EU country, especially Ireland. It is absolutely in their interest to support the propaganda tsunami in defence of this appalling deal.
-
UndercoverElephant
- Posts: 13501
- Joined: 10 Mar 2008, 00:00
- Location: UK
Yes. Not that she asks for advice much.kenneal - lagger wrote:Theresa May seems to be very good at choosing the wrong advisers; those who advised the last election, especially!
She started with a difficult hand to play, but losing her majority and ending up at the mercy of the DUP made it impossible.
Seen this video? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzLfuASXlbo 
-
woodburner
- Posts: 4124
- Joined: 06 Apr 2009, 22:45
-
Lord Beria3
- Posts: 5066
- Joined: 25 Feb 2009, 20:57
- Location: Moscow Russia
- Contact:
Hodge's latest...
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/arti ... -quit.html
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/arti ... -quit.html
Its plan (10 Downing Street) has been to make the vote in nine days’ time the moment of decision. To instil in wavering backbenchers and vacillating Ministers a recognition that they finally have nowhere to hide – it is Her Deal, No Deal or No Brexit.
But instead of recognising it as a time for choosing, many MPs are approaching the historic division like it’s a dress-rehearsal. ‘I’ll probably vote for her eventually,’ a normally rock-solid loyalist told me, ‘but I’m not sure I can back Chequers first time round.’
Where Mrs May hoped Britain’s parliamentarians would view her deal through the prism of the national interest they are – to their eternal discredit – seizing the chance for some expedient last- minute politicking.
On the first vote they intend to express crowd-pleasing displeasure at the Prime Minister’s imperfect compact with the EU.
Second time round they will – grudgingly – vote for the devil they know, claiming to be safeguarding Britain from the perils of a cliff-edge Brexit or a complete Brexit reversal.
Peace always has been and always will be an intermittent flash of light in a dark history of warfare, violence, and destruction
-
Little John
-
UndercoverElephant
- Posts: 13501
- Joined: 10 Mar 2008, 00:00
- Location: UK
"Comments are disabled for this video"....clv101 wrote:Seen this video? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzLfuASXlbo
-
UndercoverElephant
- Posts: 13501
- Joined: 10 Mar 2008, 00:00
- Location: UK
You don't seriously believe this crap, do you? The Mail is a lone voice, and not even its own readers are swallowing this bullshit. Meanwhile TM and her deal are being relentlessly savaged in both The Telegraph and The Sun.Lord Beria3 wrote:Hodge's latest...
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/arti ... -quit.html
Its plan (10 Downing Street) has been to make the vote in nine days’ time the moment of decision. To instil in wavering backbenchers and vacillating Ministers a recognition that they finally have nowhere to hide – it is Her Deal, No Deal or No Brexit.
But instead of recognising it as a time for choosing, many MPs are approaching the historic division like it’s a dress-rehearsal. ‘I’ll probably vote for her eventually,’ a normally rock-solid loyalist told me, ‘but I’m not sure I can back Chequers first time round.’
Where Mrs May hoped Britain’s parliamentarians would view her deal through the prism of the national interest they are – to their eternal discredit – seizing the chance for some expedient last- minute politicking.
On the first vote they intend to express crowd-pleasing displeasure at the Prime Minister’s imperfect compact with the EU.
Second time round they will – grudgingly – vote for the devil they know, claiming to be safeguarding Britain from the perils of a cliff-edge Brexit or a complete Brexit reversal.
The tories who are rejecting the deal are not engaged in "last-minute politickin". They think the deal stinks, and they're not going to vote for it. Forget the propaganda, Beria. There's no way on earth this deal is going to get through the commons, even if they try three times. It is unlikely to survive even the first vote, which she will lost by at least 50 votes, and maybe 200.
-
woodburner
- Posts: 4124
- Joined: 06 Apr 2009, 22:45