Space Cadet Will Hutton is sadly misinformed.

[AndySir]

It is something which you feel, presumably like God' love.

Trying to sum up UE's arguments about consciousness we know:
1. That it is nothing to do with the brain or mental processes.
2. That it is distinct from your experience of the world.
3. That it consciousness is consciousness (helpful)

Where did you get that from? Have you been reading somebody-else's posts? Because this is not remotely what I have said. Where did I say that consciousness has nothing to do with the brain?

Here.

Consciousness is not part of a brain.

Also here, in response to my attempt to define consciousness as awareness of self, surroundings and mental processes you rejected this definition not merely describing it as inadequate but saying that the processing of information in this way and consciousness as being equivalent to...

saying that bananas are the same thing as a feeling of impending doom

It also fits in with the other arguments you have made (consciousness can not exist on a computer chip), since a process that exists in the physical world can probably be replicated or modeled in the physical world. Therefore consciousness cannot be part of the physical world (which included the brain, I believe).

Nor do I have to go through your posts to find you contradicting yourself since the question you now see fit to put in bold contains its own - a pretty good definition of a private definition is one which does not have an ostensive one. I found it the question doubly inane since I appear to have given an ostensive definition of consciousness, which I repeated on the assumption that the question "Is there an ostenstive definition for this" could be answered with an ostensive definition. Evidently not. Would you care to give an ostensive definition of what you mean by a 'private ostensive' definition?

Getting to the point where you're calling me brainwashed because you are unable to adequately explain your own position is a sure signal that this conversation is nearly over. Attempting to summarise the debate as I have understood it is a useful tool when your trying to understand what the hell someone is saying. Would you care to summarise your position, particularly with reference to whether or not you consider awareness of ones self and surroundings to be part of it?

[Ludwig]

Then with respect Ralph, you have misunderstood Descartes.

I think we must agree to disagree. On the internet all posters are equal.

My opinion is that we are so deeply entangled in this brain of ours, we find it hard to see it for what it really is. A red pill/blue pill moment.

But to see at all, we must be conscious. Whether what we see is real or illusory, the fact that we are seeing it is most definitely real.

We have evolved to survive, not to see ourselves as we really are.

But if consciousness is an illusion, the very notion of seeing is meaningless - more, the very notion of notions is meaningless.

By your account, this sentence does not exist - not "does not exist" in the sense of "it exists only in my head" - but your perception of it, even as you read it, does not exist! How could a logical fallacy be more glaring? :\

My question to you is not, "Are you reading this?" but "Do you have the impression of reading this?" If the latter, by definition you are conscious.

You're mixing up the thing being perceived, and the fact of perception.

[AndySir]

P.S. Forgot to mention the remaining case. If meaning of question was can consciousness be defined as part of a private language, i.e. I will call THAT feeling consciousness the answer is no. Well you can if you want but its a tautology, it adds nothing. Kind of what I was getting at when I compared your feeling of consciousness to the feeling of God's love.

[UndercoverElephant]

It is something which you feel, presumably like God' love.

Trying to sum up UE's arguments about consciousness we know:
1. That it is nothing to do with the brain or mental processes.
2. That it is distinct from your experience of the world.
3. That it consciousness is consciousness (helpful)

Where did you get that from? Have you been reading somebody-else's posts? Because this is not remotely what I have said. Where did I say that consciousness has nothing to do with the brain?

Here.

Consciousness is not part of a brain.

Right. So I said "Consciousness is not part of a brain." I also said "Consciousness appears to be closely related to what is going on in a brain." You then summarised my argument as starting with the blind assertion "Consciousness has nothing to do with a brain."

This is what is known as a "straw man". You have completely misquoted/misinterpreted what I said.

Nor do I have to go through your posts to find you contradicting yourself

You do if you want to get away with accusing me of contradicting myself, which I have not done.

since the question you now see fit to put in bold contains its own - a pretty good definition of a private definition is one which does not have an ostensive one.

That is not a contradiction, Andy. I am using the term "private ostensive definition" because that's the name it is called by Wittgensteinians. You're right, it's not really a definition. It's another way that a word may acquire a meaning. This should all be crystal clear and does not involve any contradictions.

Are you saying that a private ostensive definition is not possible because the very idea is contradictory? If all you are doing is moaning about the name then you are playing silly word games. What matters is whether the procedure being refered to is possible. Can the word "consciousness" acquire meaning by you mentally associating the word with your own consciousness? There's nothing insane about this question.

I found it the question doubly inane since I appear to have given an ostensive definition of consciousness

You gave a plain old materialistic definition of consciousness.

, which I repeated on the assumption that the question "Is there an ostenstive definition for this" could be answered with an ostensive definition. Evidently not. Would you care to give an ostensive definition of what you mean by a 'private ostensive' definition?

Eh? That would, of course, be impossible. That's the whole point. It can only be "defined" privately.

Getting to the point where you're calling me brainwashed because you are unable to adequately explain your own position

There has been nothing inadequate about my explanations, Andy. What has been inadequate is your response to them.

Attempting to summarise the debate as I have understood it is a useful tool when your trying to understand what the hell someone is saying.

How the hell did you manage to turn "consciousness is closely related to something going on in a brain" into "consciousness has nothing whatsoever to do with a brain."? This is not a "summary". It is not possible to read what I wrote and arrive at the "summary" you arrived at without something major going wrong in the thinking that happened inbetween.

Would you care to summarise your position, particularly with reference to whether or not you consider awareness of ones self and surroundings to be part of it?

I've already responded to that question.

Here:

That's a better definition/description, but still not adequate. For example, a car alarm or a computer might be said to have "mental processes" - there's certainly something happening inside the computer which is roughly analagous to some things happening inside a brain, and both process information coming from outside and produce outputs in response. Both are capable of interacting with their surroundings. But they aren't conscious - or at least we have no reason to believe that they are and even if they were then we'd have absolutely no way of knowing about it.

So we need a terminological difference to distinguish between the sort of awareness involved in consciousness (i.e. what it is like to be human) and the sort of interaction with environment and data processing which is carried out by computers (and there is no "what it is like to be a computer"). We can't call both of these things "awareness", because information gathering/processing/outputting is not the same thing as being consciously aware that anything at all is happening.

My position is this: The word "consciousness" can only end up meaning what it means in normal conversation (including most of this thread) by means of a private ostensive definition (and I have explained what this term means several times already).

If/when we can agree that this is indeed the case, then we can explore what we can do when we combine this knowledge with other things that we can also (hopefully) agree on. Until we've got this business sorted out, there's no point in me trying to explain in any more detail what I actually believe about consciousness, or why.

[AndySir]

While waiting for UE to catch up with the cross posting how's this for some amateur philosophy.

1. Consciousness cannot be defined ostensively (via a public language).
2. The statement "All human beings are conscious" is an ostensive definition.
3. Human beings are not conscious.

Does that work? I'm new to this particular parlour game.

[UndercoverElephant]

P.S. Forgot to mention the remaining case. If meaning of question was can consciousness be defined as part of a private language, i.e. I will call THAT feeling consciousness the answer is no.

I did not ask whether it could be defined as part of a private language, regardless of the fact that I'm referring to what is known as "the private language arguments."

I have suggested that the following is this case:

Each of us makes a private definition of the word "consciousness" and then, by a sequence of inferences, concludes that other people are also conscious and can make a similar private definition. Having both done so, they can then use the word "consciousness" in public language. Not only can they do this, but we are actually doing it now. The vast majority of instances of the word "consciousness" in this thread refer to subjective experiences or qualia or "what it is like to be me", or whatever you want to call it. They do NOT refer to "something going on in a brain."

I'm not just saying that I would like to "define" that word in this way. I am saying that you yourself have already done so, and are quite happily using that privately-defined word in public, right now.

Well you can if you want but its a tautology, it adds nothing. Kind of what I was getting at when I compared your feeling of consciousness to the feeling of God's love.

They are epistemically equivalent. The only difference is that almost everybody agrees with "I am conscious" but a lot of people reject "I feel God's love."

[UndercoverElephant]

While waiting for UE to catch up with the cross posting how's this for some amateur philosophy.

1. Consciousness cannot be defined ostensively (via a public language).

I'm not sure exactly what this means. I will assume it mean this:

1. The word "consciousness" can't be defined by means of a public ostensive definition.

2. The statement "All human beings are conscious" is an ostensive definition.

That statement is neither ostensive (in fact, statements are not the sort of thing which could ever be ostensive), nor is it a definition. It is a claim about the properties of human beings in general.

3. Human beings are not conscious.

Does that work?

No.

I'm new to this particular parlour game.

OK, in that case I'll cut you a bit more slack. This particular parlour game is hard.

We have to start with definitions and premises. Only then can we proceed to having a rational debate. At the moment I am accusing you of attempting to assign two different meanings to the same word (a "false equivocation"). I'm saying that you quite happily using the word "consciousness" to refer to subjective experiences most of the time, then try to define the word to mean something else, and then continue to use the word to refer to subjective experiences apart from at critical moments when you want it to refer to something easily explainable in terms of a brain. Or even worse...you are actually using the word to mean both things at the same time, all of the time.

[AndySir]

That statement is neither ostensive (in fact, statements are not the sort of thing which could ever be ostensive), nor is it a definition. It is a claim about the properties of human beings in general.

My understanding was that the ostensive definition of blue is "That is blue" despite the fact that blue is a property of THAT. So why is the ostensive definition of conscious not "That is conscious?"

At the moment I am accusing you of attempting to assign two different meanings to the same word (a "false equivocation"). I'm saying that you quite happily using the word "consciousness" to refer to subjective experiences most of the time, then try to define the word to mean something else, and then continue to use the word to refer to subjective experiences apart from at critical moments when you want it to refer to something easily explainable in terms of a brain. Or even worse...you are actually using the word to mean both things at the same time, all of the time.

Well, I haven't mentioned subjective experiences. I attempted to define consciousness by giving it a series of properties. If I had mentioned subjective experience would that not be a property of consciousness, along with perception, learning and whatever else?

I should check that by subjective experience we both mean that qualia thing - or what I think of as the deep stoner question ("What is red? I mean really?", "Duuuuuude. You're messing with my head.") If that's the one I don't think I want it as a property of consciousness (or to be the whole thing either) on the grounds that it doesn't exist.

My definition of exist here would be is detectable, or interacts with other things which in this case fails as if my subjective experience of red was to change I would not be able to tell. If I don't know that something only knowable to me has changed then it has no impact on anything.

[UndercoverElephant]

That statement is neither ostensive (in fact, statements are not the sort of thing which could ever be ostensive), nor is it a definition. It is a claim about the properties of human beings in general.

My understanding was that the ostensive definition of blue is "That is blue" despite the fact that blue is a property of THAT. So why is the ostensive definition of conscious not "That is conscious?"

"Ostensive definition" does not refer to a sequence of words, but to an action accompanied by a word. You don't even need the "that is", but you do need to be pointing at something blue when you say the word "blue." Do this enough times and a person can come to understand what the word "blue" means (assuming they aren't colour-blind, of course.)

So how could we do this for "conscious" or "consciousness"? We can't. All we could do is point at humans and other animals we believe to be conscious, but how could this ever be understood by the other person to mean "conscious" or "consciousness" rather than "animal"? And what about people who think amoebae are conscious? Or plants? Or rocks? (Yes, some people think rocks are conscious, and I know of no way to show they are wrong.)

We can only give a (public) ostensive definition of things we can actually point to, and in a way that could eventually result in the person we are talking to understanding what a word means. This includes objects, colours and other properties of objects, actions and adverbs, and many other things.

Wittgenstein claims all ostensive definitions (private or public) don't work. Anyone who has ever taught or learned a foreign language ought to know this is not actually true, because foreign language teachers use ostensive definitions all the time. Should we allow a philosophical argument to convince us that we can't do something when we can physically observe somebody actually doing it?

At the moment I am accusing you of attempting to assign two different meanings to the same word (a "false equivocation"). I'm saying that you quite happily using the word "consciousness" to refer to subjective experiences most of the time, then try to define the word to mean something else, and then continue to use the word to refer to subjective experiences apart from at critical moments when you want it to refer to something easily explainable in terms of a brain. Or even worse...you are actually using the word to mean both things at the same time, all of the time.

Well, I haven't mentioned subjective experiences.

No, but you know precisely what I mean by that term, do you not?

I attempted to define consciousness by giving it a series of properties. If I had mentioned subjective experience would that not be a property of consciousness, along with perception, learning and whatever else?

I don't think it is just any old property of consciousness, no. It's either the whole thing, or it is the single most important and distinctive property. In other words, there is no such thing as "objective consciousness" - all consciousness is, by its nature, subjective.

"Learning" is not really a property of consciousness at all. It is a type of human behaviour. "Perception" is an important component of veridical experience and therefore closely related to consciousness, at least when we are awake and not hallucinating. But we are also very much conscious when we dream (we can even be conscious that we are conscious, and call this a "lucid dream"). But there is no perception going on when we dream.

I should check that by subjective experience we both mean that qualia thing

Yes. "Qualia", "subjective experiences" and "consciousness" are all synonyms as far as I am concerned. All I need from you is an acceptance that thing exists and that it is distinct and distinguishable from whatever brain activity we are assuming to be associated with it. If it doesn't exist then why and how are we able to talk about it?

Qualia can't be brain activity. It is part of the definition of "qualia" that we are explicitly not talking about brain activity.

- or what I think of as the deep stoner question ("What is red? I mean really?"

The word "red" means various things, but in this case we are talking about a property of an intentional (i.e. percieved) object.

If that's the one I don't think I want it as a property of consciousness (or to be the whole thing either) on the grounds that it doesn't exist.

What doesn't exist?

My definition of exist here would be is detectable

"Exist" doesn't mean the same thing as "detectable." Aliens in a far distant galaxy aren't detectable because they are too far away and have no means of making their existence known to us, as discussed in another branch of this thread. Does this mean they don't exist?

, or interacts with other things which in this case fails as if my subjective experience of red was to change I would not be able to tell. If I don't know that something only knowable to me has changed then it has no impact on anything.

If we are talking about it (and it is not imaginary), then it has had an impact on something, even if it is just our conversation.

[AndySir]

Round and round in circles we go again... but we do at least get to the point that you consider the concept of qualia to be equivalent to consciousness. I argued that quales do not exist and I argued that on the basis that I could not detect if my subjective experience of something had changed (if my perception of red changed to what I would previously have thought of as green, for example). In your terms, then, I don't believe that consciousness exists and I am not conscious.

On existence. Any putative aliens would be detectable to themselves. They interact with the universe. A change in subjective experience is detectable to nothing in the universe.

If it can be thought of or described it must exist is a variant of the ontological argument which is (a) obviously wrong in any scientific understand (b) already been tortuously dismissed in terms of this parlour game by Kant. I think the grounds were that we add nothing to the description of anything by saying it 'is'. Kant described it as a miserable little tautology.

All of this requires that you accept the assertion that consciousness cannot be defined except by reference to itself and to do that you have to accept your definition of consciousness. Another miserable little tautology, but more than that since for this position to hold consciousness must not only be indescribable but also not material (As if every physical property of your brain could be copied to an artificial brain the qualia of 'red' would also be transferred if it were physical, meaning consciousness could be described objectively). When it gets to the point that you have to make up another plain of existence, which you've got not evidence for, no experience of (subjective or otherwise) and no way of knowing about isn't it time to abandon the theory that requires it?

[Ludwig]

Round and round in circles we go again... but we do at least get to the point that you consider the concept of qualia to be equivalent to consciousness. I argued that quales do not exist and I argued that on the basis that I could not detect if my subjective experience of something had changed (if my perception of red changed to what I would previously have thought of as green, for example). In your terms, then, I don't believe that consciousness exists and I am not conscious.

It doesn't matter whether you call it red or green or chicken chasseur, it's still a quale.

You are misunderstanding the meaning of "quale" if you think a quale needs to be tied to a particular word. Qualia have nothing fundamentally to do with language.

A cat has an itch. That itch a quale; the cat doesn't need to give it a name, to know that humans give it the name "itch", or even to have any concept of names.

When it gets to the point that you have to make up another plain
of existence, which you've got not evidence for, no experience of (subjective or otherwise) and no way of knowing about isn't it time to abandon the theory that requires it?

The whole point he has been making is that he has evidence for it. He can't share this evidence with you, but he assumes that you are sentient and therefore...

Oh why bother? By your own definitions, you are saying, "I am completely unaware that I am having this discussion." Can we just clarify that that statement sounds perfectly sane to you?

[UndercoverElephant]

Round and round in circles we go again... but we do at least get to the point that you consider the concept of qualia to be equivalent to consciousness.

I would have been happy to tell you that at the start...

I argued that quales do not exist and I argued that on the basis that I could not detect if my subjective experience of something had changed (if my perception of red changed to what I would previously have thought of as green, for example). In your terms, then, I don't believe that consciousness exists and I am not conscious.

In most ordinary people's terms, you are claiming that there is no such thing as consciousness.

On existence. Any putative aliens would be detectable to themselves.

What use is that to us? A small teapot-lifeform orbiting pluto would also be detectable to itself.

They interact with the universe. A change in subjective experience is detectable to nothing in the universe.

Isn't it? So when you tread on my foot and it hurts a lot and I scream in pain because it hurts, this is not detectable to anything in the universe?

If it can be thought of or described it must exist is a variant of the ontological argument which is (a) obviously wrong in any scientific understand

Eh?

(b) already been tortuously dismissed in terms of this parlour game by Kant.

I think the grounds were that we add nothing to the description of anything by saying it 'is'. Kant described it as a miserable little tautology.

All of this requires that you accept the assertion that consciousness cannot be defined except by reference to itself and to do that you have to accept your definition of consciousness. Another miserable little tautology, but more than that since for this position to hold consciousness must not only be indescribable but also not material (As if every physical property of your brain could be copied to an artificial brain the qualia of 'red' would also be transferred if it were physical, meaning consciousness could be described objectively). When it gets to the point that you have to make up another plain of existence, which you've got not evidence for, no experience of (subjective or otherwise) and no way of knowing about isn't it time to abandon the theory that requires it?

OK, let's get this straight.

I am currently talking to a person who is (a) a materialist and (b) thinks Kant supports his position.

Is that correct?

[AndySir]

In your terms, then, I don't believe that consciousness exists and I am not conscious.

In most ordinary people's terms, you are claiming that there is no such thing as consciousness.

An appeal to the masses now? Common knowledge?

On existence. Any putative aliens would be detectable to themselves.

What use is that to us? A small teapot-lifeform orbiting pluto would also be detectable to itself.

It is nevertheless possible to be detected because it interacts with the universe. Your subjective experience does not.

They interact with the universe. A change in subjective experience is detectable to nothing in the universe.

Isn't it? So when you tread on my foot and it hurts a lot and I scream in pain because it hurts, this is not detectable to anything in the universe?

That is not a change in subjective experience - you seem to be taking that to mean seeing red changing to not seeing red. You are arguing that your consciousness is what it is to see red. What it is to feel pain is not detectable in this scenario.

Finally...

OK, let's get this straight.

I am currently talking to a person who is (a) a materialist and (b) thinks Kant supports his position.

Is that correct?

I think materialism is an accurate statement of my position based on the wiki definition I've just looked up. I don't know if Kant supports that position but I do know that he dismissed the ontological argument, which I can also do less stringently via reductio ad absurdum. Where does that leave us?

I note you ignored the question about information, which I think is a pretty big flaw in this subjective experience argument. I'm bringing out the numbers again...

1. Consciousness can only be explained via subjective experience.
2. All physical objects can be described objectively (molecules in motion)
3. The brain is a physical object.
4. Subjective experience in contained within the brain.

Therefore

1. Subjective experience can be described objectively.

Alternatively subjective experience is not contained within the brain or any other physical form of information (the only possible position you can hold without abandoning the idea of qualia or denying the principle that information cannot be destroyed). You then require a mechanism for storing information outside the physical universe and for transferring it to the physical universe.

So there is a very simple Occam's razor argument to be made here: either there is another plane of existence beyond the physical or the question "What is red like?" is meaningless. That looks like a pretty clear choice to me.

[UndercoverElephant]

In your terms, then, I don't believe that consciousness exists and I am not conscious.

In most ordinary people's terms, you are claiming that there is no such thing as consciousness.

An appeal to the masses now? Common knowledge?

What I am doing is saying that you are denying the thing that most people consider to be just about the most completely obvious thing they could think of. That's not just stupid sheep-like people ("the masses"). It's also large amounts of educated and intelligent people.

You are denying your own consciousness. If that's what you want to do then fine, but don't kid yourself that this anything other than a very bizarre thing to believe. Maybe even more bizarre than thinking the moon landings didn't happen.

On existence. Any putative aliens would be detectable to themselves.

What use is that to us? A small teapot-lifeform orbiting pluto would also be detectable to itself.

It is nevertheless possible to be detected because it interacts with the universe. Your subjective experience does not.

So says you. Precisely how do you know this? Did science tell you? If not, what did?

If I've got a headache and I end up taking a painkiller is it not the case that my subjective experience interacted with the universe? Is it not the case that I only took the painkiller because I was experiencing pain?

They interact with the universe. A change in subjective experience is detectable to nothing in the universe.

Isn't it? So when you tread on my foot and it hurts a lot and I scream in pain because it hurts, this is not detectable to anything in the universe?

That is not a change in subjective experience...

Nonsense, Andy. When you tread on my foot then it changes my subjective experience.

- you seem to be taking that to mean seeing red changing to not seeing red. You are arguing that your consciousness is what it is to see red.

You're damned right I am....

What it is to feel pain is not detectable in this scenario.

Isn't it?

A patient goes to a doctor and says they have a pain in their back. The doctor tries pressing various points on the patient's back. Here? No. Here? No. Here? Arghhhh, yes, right there!!!

According to you, the doctor isn't able to detect when you are feeling pain - he can't detect the point where your subjective experience changes from NO PAIN to PAIN.

Which is, of course, total nonsense.

OK, let's get this straight.

I am currently talking to a person who is (a) a materialist and (b) thinks Kant supports his position.

Is that correct?

I think materialism is an accurate statement of my position based on the wiki definition I've just looked up. I don't know if Kant supports that position...

If there's one person in philosophical history who rained on the naive materialist's parade it was Emmanual Kant.

but I do know that he dismissed the ontological argument, which I can also do less stringently via reductio ad absurdum. Where does that leave us?

Exactly where we were before, given that the ontological argument has nothing to do with anything we've been talking about.

I note you ignored the question about information, which I think is a pretty big flaw in this subjective experience argument. I'm bringing out the numbers again...

1. Consciousness can only be explained via subjective experience.

Don't understand this. Consciousness *IS* subjective experience.

2. All physical objects can be described objectively (molecules in motion)

Agreed.

3. The brain is a physical object.

Agreed.

4. Subjective experience in contained within the brain.

Not agreed, because it is incomprehensible drivel. Subjective experience isn't "contained" in anything. It does not have a location. If I slice open your skull and rummage around inside then I will not find any subjective experience.

Alternatively subjective experience is not contained within the brain or any other physical form of information (the only possible position you can hold without abandoning the idea of qualia or denying the principle that information cannot be destroyed). You then require a mechanism for storing information outside the physical universe and for transferring it to the physical universe.

Not quite. Let me give you an analogy. Think of the setup of a cinema. So you have some information stored on a reel of film, you have a projector, and you have a big screen. When you turn on the projector a moving picture appears on the big screen. Did I need a mechanism for storing information outside of the reel of film? No. I did require a mechanism for copying the information from one place to another, but here the analogy breaks down. There would have to be some sort of connection, but "mechanism" is a word for an explicitly physical connection and we are talking about metaphysics here. The "mechanism" in question would have to be specified in an intepretation of quantum mechanics.

So there is a very simple Occam's razor argument to be made here: either there is another plane of existence beyond the physical or the question "What is red like?" is meaningless. That looks like a pretty clear choice to me.

Then you need to be introduced to Kant.

Are you familiar with the terms "phenomena" and "noumena"? If not, then please do some googling.

Now...how does "the plane of existence of the physical" correspond to phenomena and noumena? When you say "the physical", do you mean phenomena, noumena, both or neither?

[AndySir]

I'm done with neologisms and appeals to authority, Kant, Wittgenstein et al., particuarly since you are now using the term qualia to refer to something quite different to its wikipedia definition so I have no idea what you're on about. I have no desire to introduce new unclear definitions.

This argument hinges on the assertion that consciousness is a non-physical for which not only do you have no evidence but there is no POSSIBLE evidence. Clearly physical evidence is impossible for a non-physical thing and there is no subjective evidence unless you can tell me how a physical subjective experience would differ from a non-physical one. Saying there is no such thing as a physical subjective experience fails as the reason is clearly 'because subjective experience is not physical'.

The argument is clearly tautological and so even by the rules of this particular parlour game worthless.

To put it another way you often repeat in response to this tack that consciousness IS subjective experience, in which case you are using subjective experience both as the evidence and the definition which is also clearly an error.