UndercoverElephant wrote:
That there may be a correspondence between conscious states and E-M activity in the brain may turn out to be correct (although I know of no actual evidence to suggest that it is), but this in itself doesn't do much to reduce the mysteriousness of consciousness - we still have to explain why an E-M field should "cause" or "create" this consciousness, and we still have to answer the question "what IS consciousness?" Saying X causes Y doesn't tell you what Y actually is, especially if X can be physically defined and Y can't. The position looks like a sort of dualistic epiphenomenalism, and I'm not sure it makes any more sense than materialism does.
Basically, the theory you're proposing still starts with the material universe and then tries to add something to it in order to provide an explanation for consciousness. I think we have to go in the other direction and not start with the material universe at all.
My understanding of Pockett's hypothesis is not that electromagnetic fields
cause consciousness but that there is a one-to-one correlation between them and consciousness states. She doesn't go so far as to offer explanations for such a correlation.
What many materialists (and dualists) fail to acknowledge is that what they call the material world is based on information received about that (putative) world via the senses. To use the example of our most highly developed sense, vision: what we see is, in no sense, "what is really there". Just because we see more colours than a dog does not mean that our vision is "complete". It is interpretative. There are many layers to vision. Take away the layer, for example, that deals with motion, and you will see things jerk around. (Oliver Sacks talks about seizures he's had when he loses his perception of motion.)
A book I read about our sense of vision described it as "controlled hallucination".
There is no proof of the existence of matter as something distinct from what we perceive through our senses. If our equations deal with such "matter", they still do not offer a definition of what matter
is, or prove that it is something in some way more "solid" or "definite" than consciousness.
Maybe it didn't sound like it, but I am also of the opinion that by starting with materialism, we are starting at the wrong end of the spectrum.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/
Instead of trying to explain how consciousness arises from matter, or, like the idealists, trying to explain material reality in terms of consciousness, neutral monism claims that reality is made of neither matter nor consciousness but something else entirely.
That does not make sense to me. How can matter or consciousness arise from something that is "entirely" different from either of them?
As far as matter is concerned, it is true that we can never prove that it exists at all. Ultimately, all our evidence for matter exists in the form of perceptions, which are subjective.
But you can't dismiss consciousness in the same way. Consciousness - or at least my consciousness - exists, full stop. Yours might not - everything I'm experiencing, including this dialogue with you, may be just a figment of my imagination. But I know that this figment is being perceived, and the thing perceiving it is my consciousness.
So if reality is "made of neither matter nor consciousness", you are invoking at the very least a new dualism: you are claiming that there are at least two kinds of "stuff": whatever makes up "reality", and the consciousness with which I contemplate this very idea. If you are allowing the existence of matter in addition, then your model is not just dualistic but [triplistic?].
My opinion is that whatever is at the root of reality must be related to what we call consciousness. Consciousness must be at least derivable from it, because without the existence of consciousness I wouldn't even be having these thoughts.
"We're just waiting, looking skyward as the days go down / Someone promised there'd be answers if we stayed around."